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THE BLESSED AND THE DAMNED: AN INTRODUCTION
In the wake of a civil war, what factors contribute to the institutional arrangements po-
litical leaders will choose? There has been a burgeoning body of research on this subject in
recent years, as many studies have taken up the question of post civil war democratization
(Paris 1997; Wood 2001; Wantchekon 2004; Gurses and Mason 2006 specifically). While
these studies have shown that post civil war democracy is much more likely than previously
thought by the field, predicting whether or not a country will become democratic or au-
tocratic is a difficult task. This paper develops a theory of what conditions make it more
likely that state leaders will choose a democracy after a civil war ends. It builds on the em-
pirical work done by Gurses and Mason (2006), employing their dataset to test a model of
democratic and autocratic choices in the post civil war state. In particular, it focuses on the
role of international actors and what influence they may have in the decisions made about
institutional arrangements. It also contrasts largely with previous attempts to theorize the
emergence of democracy after a civil war (Wantchekon 2004) by breaking apart previous
work’s assumptions and placing a focus on the story of how states get from the end of the
civil war to an institutional arrangement. The theory in this paper presents a story of how
a state gets from the end of a civil war to clear institutional choices.
This paper seeks to places a focus not on the causes of the civil war or the specific
dynamics of violence or mobilization in the civil war that might impact a long-term peace.
Nor does it focus on broad structural or cultural characteristics that have been associated
with the emergence of democracy in relatively stable polities (e.g. Lipset 1959; Almond and
Verba 1963). Rather, it focuses on the period after the civil war ends, when states are walking
the fine line between regressing back into a civil war or developing consolidated institutional
arrangements (whether democratic or autocratic) in which peace might endure. It builds
on classic process theories of democratization (specifically Rustow (1970)) and a rationalist
outlook on conflict outbreak (Fearon 1995). Democratization after the end of a civil war is
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a function of four aspects of the peace process: a negotiated settlement to end the conflict,
credible commitments to peace which are established via sustainable forms of international
peacekeeping, demobilization of rebel forces to ensure that the warmaking abilities of rebels
are diminished, preventing them from starting the war again, and a cooperative international
environment, which helps to ensure that remobilization of potential violent challengers to
the new government is unlikely.
For policy makers, this research question is of pressing importance. The conflict in Iraq
has become to many observers a civil war. If an Iraqi democracy is an attainable goal for
western foreign policy (Paris 1997), then it will most likely go through the same process as
many of the post civil war democracies over the past half century. The theory developed in
this paper speaks largely to policy options that the international community have available,
constructing a story of democratization that is, from a policy standpoint, “easier” than
work that focuses on structural or cultural factors. It is a story of how certain peace policies
enacted by international actors can help or hurt the prospects a post-conflict state has for
democratization.
Though the scholarly literature includes small-n qualitative research that focuses on the
democratic transitions out of civil wars (Paris 1997; Manning 2001; Wood 2001), the field
is lacking a specific transition theory with a large-n analysis that helps us understand the
specific process between a civil war, one of the most destructive political phenomena that
is studied, and the decision by leaders to become a democracy1. There is some quantitative
literature that focuses on lasting peace after civil wars, which typically notes that democra-
tization or political powersharing contributes to a lasting peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).
However, there is no study that shows what factors link attributes of the post civil war
environment to the achievement of democracy. This paper seeks to bridge the gap by theo-
retically placing the political transition after a civil war as a function of the peace process
after a civil war. Analytically, this paper employs a more specific test of its hypotheses than
previous works. Previous attempts at testing factors that contribute to democracy after a
civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Gurses and Mason 2006) tests levels of democracy at
1Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is a published exception and Gurses and Mason (2006) is an unpublished
exception to this and will be addressed below.
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certain years after the civil war ends. While this attempt allows for some causal inference,
it is not specific enough to get the particular characteristics of transitions. By testing only
for movement along a scale of democracy, it becomes difficult to know when a state actually
“becomes” democratic. The previous works thus only allow analysts to tell whether or not
states are headed in the direction of democracy. This paper employs event history models
to determine when states reach well-established standards of level of democracy that would
firmly indicate that a state is actually democratic. Thus, this paper helps explain what
actually makes achieving democracy more likely.
The sequence of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on summarizing the relevant
literature that pertains to this question. I focus largely on process theories of democratization
(Rustow 1970; Huntington 1991; Wantchekon 2004) to derive my own theory for democracy
out of civil wars. I also summarize and analyze previous literature that focuses on conflict
resolution and building a long-term peace after civil wars (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Fett
and Weingarten 1999; Walter 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). In Chapter 3, I develop my
theory of post civil war institutional choice, which is a peace process theory of post civil war
democratization. The theory is to some degree both deductive and inductive, drawing from
rationalist explanations of war and post civil war democracy (Fearon 1995; Wantchekon
2004), extending the logic of literature that theorizes on long-term peace (Walter 1997,
1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). It focuses on the decisions that leaders on both sides of
the conflict are faced with in the wake of a violent domestic conflict and the effective use of
policies by international actors to help those leaders make the decision of democracy. After
developing the theory, in Chapter 4 I describe the method I employ to test the hypotheses
derived from the theory, which is an event history analysis. I then test the hypotheses and
find some consistent support for the conditions described in the theory. Finally, I conclude the
study by discussing specific implications for researchers who are studying the very important




2.1. Process Theory and Post Civil War Democratization
I begin with a short overview of some of the major process theories of democratization
(Rustow 1970; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Wantchekon 2004). These theories em-
phasize the decisions made by leaders as part of an interaction between governing elites,
opposition elites, and groups outside the elites (including the masses). These theories ap-
propriately lay the ground work for the study of post civil war democratization. In postwar
settings, the former combatants must negotiate a way to design the new state. Institutions
do not merely develop over a long period of time. Indeed, many of the success stories of
post civil war democracy, such as Mozambique, became democracies in a short period of
time after the resolution of the civil war. Process theory contrasts sharply with structural or
cultural theories of democratization. Structural theories, such as those put forth by Lipset
(1959) or Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), emphasize certain societal char-
acteristics, such as economic development, as encouraging the development of democratic
political habits (such as contract enforcement and individually caring about what happens
within the national political stage) or the expansion of the middle class (now politically
relevant). The development of these structural characteristics forces elites to open up the
system and democratize over time. Cultural theories, such as those put forth by Almond
and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993), emphasize certain characteristics of the people, such
as normative belief systems, that are more synchronized with the tolerance and compromise
required for a democracy to function properly.
Both structural and cultural theories of democratization require some societal prereq-
uisite for democracy to occur, whether some form of economic or political development
(structural) or some mass level of normative commitment to democratic values (cultural).
Process theories require no sort of normative commitment by elites, groups or the masses.
Nor do they require structural characteristics such as a well developed economy to have
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democracy follow. Though both of these prerequisites certainly may aid democracy, they
are not necessary or sufficient in process theory. Process theories instead focus on the inter-
action between the government and the opposition (typically just the elites). For post civil
war states, these types of theories are the most appropriate. This is simply because in states
after civil wars, there is almost no way for them to meet some of the major prerequisites of
structural or cultural theories. Elites who have just fought a civil war do not seem to have
much, if any, normative commitment to democratic habits and values. During a civil war, the
state’s economy is also likely to come to a near collapse, with rebel groups focusing on either
black market or rent behavior to mobilize troops (Weinstein 2005). Further, Przeworski, Al-
varez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) show that there is little clear evidence that states need
to clear some benchmark of economic development to democratize, but they do show that
higher levels of economic development make regimes (both democratic and autocratic) more
likely to survive. Therefore, in the case of post civil war democracy, something else must
explain the emergence of democracy besides broad structural or cultural characteristics.
The major early process theory of democratization comes from Rustow (1970). He em-
phasizes that leaders do not have to be normatively committed to democratic values. Rather
they reach a democratic outcome through a conflict in which no one side can effectively win
and the two sides compromise. Wantchekon (2004) echoes this, presenting this for a civil war
setting, which I detail below1. Rustow’s (1970) theory of democratization focuses on four
stages that states go through in order to become democratic. His first stage is the only real
pre-requisite presented in his theory, and this is the concept of “national unity”. This essen-
tially means that the relevant political actors must all agree on who is to be included in the
state and what the state is. This pre-requisite is problematic for post civil war states, since
some civil wars are fought for inclusion into the system or separation from the nation-state
altogether, in the case of separatist conflicts or irredentist conflicts. This could mean that
separatist conflicts are more difficult to resolve than civil wars that are fought over control
1Though Przeworski (1991) and Huntington (1991) are very notable and important process theorists of
democratization, I focus primarily on the work of Rustow (1970) and Wantchekon (2004) here due to their
relevance to civil war. Wantchekon’s (2004) specific focus on civil wars makes it the ideal jumping off point
for an empirical study.
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of the central capital of the state, such as ideological conflicts. Indeed some of the civil war
literature (Toft 2003) points out that territory can represent an issue that cannot be easily
divided, making such civil wars especially difficult to resolve.
Rustow’s (1970) other three phases are the preparatory phase, the decision phase, and
the habituation phase. This paper is really only concerned with the preparatory phase
(in this case, a civil war) and the decision phase (the point at which leaders actually choose
institutional arrangments). The preparatory phase is the stage in which groups are in conflict
over what the state should look like. Though probably not conceived of as violent conflict
by Rustow, envisioning rather a process in which the government and opposition negotiate,
the civil war itself represents the preparatory phase for such states. The habituation phase
is essentially the process of democratic consolidation, in which the elites and masses develop
democratic norms over time after being forced to live with democratic institutions for some
time2. Rustow’s theory provides a useful structure through which scholar’s can think about
the process of democratization. It is also useful because it applies to almost every case of
democratization (except for a unilateral, unprovoked decision to democratize by an autocratic
leader).
Probably the best known work on post civil war democratization is that of Wantchekon
(2004). Wantchekon outlines a formal theory in which leaders of the government and the
opposition choose to become democracies after a civil war if there is no way for one side to
become a decisive victor. There is also, in his theory, the option of inviting in an external
arbiter, but this external actor, which he terms “Leviathan”, is one sided. The internal
actors know this, and will never both invite the external enforcer. The two actors will
choose democracy if they have a reasonable expectation to win the first election, which if
the war was a stalemate, may be a reasonable expectation for both sides.
The major flaw with Wantchekon’s (2004) theory, and one that this paper specifically
addresses, is that he assumes that once “democracy” is chosen to end the war, the com-
mitments by the two former combatants to democratize are credible and demobilization of
forces takes place, which reinforces the peace necessary for democracy to survive. This is
2See Linz and Stepan (1996) and Diamond (1999) for excellent outlines and descriptions of democratic
consolidation
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a major problem with Wantchekon’s theory. It is very similar to some rationalist work on
civil war termination (particularly Mason and Fett 1996 and Mason, Weingarten, and Fett
1999), except that what is treated as a negotiated settlement in those works is represented
as democracy by Wantchekon (2004). While negotiated settlements may lead to democracy,
they are not the same concepts. In fact, the goal of this paper is to tell the story of what
happens between a negotiated settlement and the choice of democracy. By assuming that the
commitments to a negotiated settlement or democracy are credible, Wantchekon (2004) is
violating some normal assumptions of the anarchic nature of conflict politics (Fearon 1995).
Also, just from reading some case histories (Paris 1997) of attempts at post civil war democ-
ratization, I do not assume that demobilization is automatic. In the case of Angola, Paris
(1997) notes, demobilization was set to occur after the first election. When the election
happened there, the loser, still armed, rejected the results and resumed fighting.
Gurses and Mason (2006) present a large-n empirical analysis of the factors most as-
sociated with post civil war democracy. They examined the level of democracy at years
five and ten after the civil war ended in order to gauge which factors lead to more positive
movement toward democracy. Their analysis mainly focused on attributes of the civil war
itself and factors from the post civil war environment. Their strongest predictors of positive
movement toward democracy are civil war factors. Specifically, negotiated settlements are
positively associated with more democracy and outright victories by either the government
or the rebels are associated with less democracy. They also found that post civil war states
emerging from ethnic wars are less likely to move toward democracy.
Another, more well-known study of post civil war reconstruction is by Doyle and Sam-
banis (2000). Their main goal is to gauge the impact of international peacebuilding policies
in post civil war states. Among their standards of success is whether or not a state reaches
a standard of democracy by year two and five after a civil war ends. They find that inter-
national peacebuilding policies are significant predictors of a stable peace as well as helping
states reach a standard of democracy. Specifically, the multi-dimensional peacebuilding op-
eration, which takes on tasks of observing elections and helping to rebuild infrastructure,
goes above and beyond monitoring a cease-fire and securing a settlement. They can also
help to build peace in the long term by aiding transitions.
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The research by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), while a step in the right direction, suffers
from some flaws. Specifically, their choice of analyzing the level of democracy at years
two and five after the civil war ends is problematic. Their theory is generally about how
features of the civil war affect institutional development after the war ends. However, by
measuring democracy five years after the war ends, it is difficult to know how other factors
may contribute to the level of democracy between the end of the civil war and year five.
By employing a cross-sectional analysis, it is difficult to determine this kind of sequence
of processes. This decision for years two and five is also somewhat arbitrary. If a country
becomes a democracy in year six after a civil war ends, their analysis cannot explain it.
This leaves the possibility of censoring out potentially important cases of post civil war
democratization. Thus, a more precise analysis is necessary to more fully understand the
phenomenon.
2.2. The Post Civil War Peace Process
Democratization is often depicted as part of the solution to creating a sustainable peace
following a civil war. Democracy as an institutionalized means of resolving contentious
political issues makes peace among political actors necessary. A large part of the attention
in civil war literature is centered primarily on ending the civil war (Mason and Fett 1996;
Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). But since this paper is focused largely on what happens
after a settlement or outright victory, the more important research for this question concerns
what happens after the civil war ends. Since this paper is also primarily about how the post
civil war peace process affects transitions to democracy, much of this literature is described
as the theory is developed. This section examines some of the major works that are about
post civil war peace as a whole, rather than specific policies, such as peacekeeping, and how
they affect the peace process.
How the civil war ends plays a large role in how the state will be structured after the
war is over (Gurses and Mason 2006). The literature is mixed with regard to the effects of
negotiated settlements and outright military victories on the duration of peace. Licklider
(1995) shows mixed results for negotiated settlements and outright victories with regard
to long-term peace, noting that military victories often including stripping one side of the
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warmaking ability completely, thus lowering the likelihood of renewed conflict. Mukherjee
(2006) formalizes an argument that contends that power sharing arrangements put forth after
a military victory are more likely to result in a longer peace because there is no incentive to
misrepresent capabilities because one side was an outright loser. With each side knowing the
other’s ability to win a war, the losers are much more likely to take whatever powersharing
deal they can get and are not likely to try and alter it by returning to a losing war. However,
power sharing after a negotiated settlement involves two sides who are likely to misrepresent
capabilities in the hope of starting the war again and winning. However, Mukherjee (2006)
also finds a positive effect for democracy on producing a stable peace.
On the other side, Poe, Mason, Colley and Quinn (2005) note that negotiated settlements
result in better human rights records of states after a civil war than either military victories
by the government or rebel groups. Gurses and Mason (2006) similarly note that negotiated
settlements are associated with higher levels of democracy five and ten years after a civil war
than are military victories. If negotiated settlements are more likely to result in democracy
and strong democracies are more likely to prevent the onset of war than other types of
institutions (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001 also show this), then it seems that
if states that experienced negotiated settlements become democracies, long-term peace is
more likely.
The work of Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and
Walter (1999) are focused on how states translate negotiated settlements into a long term
peace. Hartzell et al. (2001) find that negotiated settlements are more likely to produce a
stable peace if the previous regime was democratic, if the wars were long, low intensity con-
flicts, if there were autonomy provisions for territorial claims, and third party enforcement.
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) follow up with similar results finding that the more extensive
power sharing arrangements and the presence of a third party to enforce the peace result in
a longer peace for states whose civil war ended in a negotiated settlement. Walter (1999)
focuses on some of the problems presented in Fearon’s (1995) explanation for why interstate
wars occur, specifically, the problem of credible commitments. She concludes her study by
recommending that outside enforcement be present to enforce the settlement, but specifically
that such enforcers must be committed to the cause. If such enforcers, like peacekeepers,
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are not thought to be committed or capable by the former warring parties, it could result
in defection by the former conflicting actors. She further recommends slower demobilization
and democratization processes to reduce the insecurity felt by the former litigants, who fear
a defection by the other side and a return to fighting.
To summarize, the research focused on what produces a stable peace in the wake of a
civil war has mixed findings. Some (Licklider 1995; Mukherjee 2006) indicate that military
victories are more likely to be conducive to a lasting peace, while others (Poe at al. 2005;
Gurses and Mason 2006) indicate that negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to more
positive outcomes such as less repression and higher levels of democracy. Wantchekon (2004)
argues that negotiated settlements are the leading way for states to transition to democracy
out of a civil war. The literature on negotiated settlements emphasizes a few key concepts,
specifically democracy and third party enforcement of the peace process (Hartzell et al 2001;
Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Below, I develop a
theory that builds on the findings of previous research and puts together a story of how
states get from the end of a civil war to democracy.
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CHAPTER 3
WARLORD CHOICES: AN UPDATED THEORY OF POST CIVIL WAR
DEMOCRATIZATION
The theory presented here on post-civil war democracy describes the conditions which
may make democracy more likely after a conflict. It begins by describing the dilemma that
former combatants face when choosing post conflict institutions and then explains how the
presence of certain conditions may make the option of democracy more likely. The dilemma
is essentially a prisoner’s dilemma in which actors cannot credibly commit to cooperate to
provide some type of public good (Olson 1965; Axelrod 1984; Ostrom 1990). This dilemma
is applied to post civil war scenarios by previous works (Walter 1997, 1999 specifically), but
deviates because of its focus on the movement toward democracy, rather than on building
credible commitments around negotiated settlements (Walter 1997) or a long term peace
and powersharing institutions (Walter 1999). After this discussion, I develop the specific
hypotheses about four conditions that make democracy more or less likely. These conditions
are: a negotiated settlement to end the war, credible commitments to choose democracy,
demobilization before the first election, and the lack of a hostile international environment.
3.1. The Warlord’s Dilemma
Civil wars represent a situation in which a state is essentially ruled by force by warring
factions in an anarchic system. It is very similar to the international system because during
a civil war, the state cannot form a monopoly on the use of violence. After a civil war,
uncertainty prevails for the new leaders of the state. This is the period in which leaders
have to decide what shape the post war state will take. Will it be democratic with open
institutions that have elected leaders? Will it be a state in which an elite power-sharing
oligarchy takes root? Will it be a dictatorship ruled by a small cadre of elites? Though this
theory only focuses on the first question, it is important to remember that there are many
options for leaders to choose.
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The major actors in this story are the leadership of the former government and former
rebels. With regard to what they would like to happen institutionally, I assume they have
similar preferences. Each group most prefers an autocracy with themselves as the benevolent
dictator, ruling the country with justice as they see it. They each least prefer the malicious
autocratic rule of their civil war opponent, in which oppression is rampant and freedom in
short supply. I make these assumptions based on the idea that political leaders want to stay
in office as long as they can (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). If
they can be certain that they will be in office and in control of the agenda, they will opt for
this. Autocracies are more certain than democracies, since elections present the opportunity
of losing power with regularity. After a civil war, when the state can essentially be remade,
it seems that both sides wish to create the state in their image, so to speak. Thus, even
if actors do not have a malicious agenda against the other side, they would still prefer to
be in complete control. In between the preferences of autocracy lies the institutionalized
uncertainty of democracy. Democracy essentially is an institutionalized way of preventing
each group’s enemy from taking complete control of the state. It is not likely to be any
group’s first preference, because I assume that each actor will want complete control of the
territory, use of force, and ultimately the policy agenda. Even if the stated goals of a rebel
group or government were either to bring or restore democracy during the civil war, if they
are given the option of total control, they will most likely take it. The way in which a civil
war ends is likely to determine which of the above three options will become an available
equilibrium outcome for institutional choice.
Figure 3.1. Institutional Choice Likelihood by Civil War Result
Government Victory Rebel Victory Negotiated Settlement
Autocracy More Likely More Likely Possible
Democracy Less Likely Less Likely More Likely
There are basically three ways for a civil war to end, each with different degrees of
uncertainty: a negotiated settlement, government victory, or a rebel victory (Mason and Fett
1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). A victorious government likely signals a return
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to policies and institutions that were in place before the civil war erupted. A victorious
rebel group signals the emergence of institutions and policies preferred by the rebellion’s
core actors, with the spoils of government given to those who were loyal to and supported
the rebellion (Weinstein 2005). The reason the institutional outcome is much more certain
after a military victory is because the victor’s have proven their ability to monopolize the use
of force by defeating the other side. After defeating the other side, there is little incentive to
include them in post civil war governance. A rebel victory may actually be the most decisive
victory of the two. A rebel army typically starts very small and must build its strength over
time. Thus, at the beginning of the war, the government has the upper hand. However,
if the rebels can defeat the government outright, they have gained enough capability to
control the state altogether (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1996; Bapat 2005; Gurses and
Mason 2006). A government victory may actually result in some concessions to the rebels to
prevent remobilization in the future. However, a government victory is still not likely to yield
itself to the uncertainty of elections. Thus, the most uncertain post civil war environment
is when the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement. These are situations in which neither
side could successfully defeat the other and must, in some way, compromise as to who will
rule and how that will be done. Democracy has been defined as institutionalized uncertainty
about who will rule, so it seems that a natural extension of a negotiated settlement is
to choose democratic institutions. Indeed, Wantchekon’s (2004) theory argues just this.
However, in the wake of a negotiated settlement to end a civil war, there remains the credible
commitment problem with regard to choosing and implementing institutional arrangements.
Such commitment problems are different from those surrounding the negotiated settlement
because leaders are faced with solving many commitment problems over a wide range of
issues beyond just stopping the fighting. There are, for instance, implementation of the
demobilization agreements, setting up branches of government, arranging and organizing
elections, and so on. Thus, while it may make democracy a realistic option, a negotiated
settlement does not imply that it will actually be implemented.
In order to implement democracy after a negotiated settlement, it is necessary to get the
actors to cooperate yet again. They have cooperated thus far on ending the civil war. But,
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as noted above, a whole new array of credible commitment problems have arisen concern-
ing institutional arrangements. Relevant actors must cooperate and agree to 1) implement
democracy in the first place, 2) hold elections and decide on when to hold elections, 3) im-
plement the terms of the settlement in such a way that facilitates elections, and 4) begin
the process of basic state building (as in building a police force, an economy, a new military,
infrastructure, and so on). Thus, the dilemma that the former litigants face is essentially a
modified prisoner’s dilemma, one in which joint defection could lead back into war, a single
defection from one side could lead either back into war or into an autocratic regime, and
joint cooperation (could) lead to a democratic outcome. This presentation may be too sim-
plistic, because I imply that their cooperation is really needed on one major issue: whether
or not to adopt democratic rules of the game. In reality, however, the commitment needed
by both actors involves many issues, some of which are noted above. However, to keep the
theoretical story simple and clear, I summarize the dilemma in Figure 2, focused around
the major issue of democracy vs. non-democracy. These represent likely outcomes of co-
operation vs. non-cooperation by the potential democratizers. Even if both actors want a
democratic outcome, absent credible commitments by both sides, they might well take the
opportunity during a post settlement period to re-mobilize and build back their strength in
order to secure themselves should another conflict erupt (Greig and Diehl 20051).
1Greig and Diehl (2005) note that this is the “pessimistic” view of peacekeeping. These are situations in
which actors are using the presence of cease-fires and peacekeeping operations to keep an eye on each other
and build up their own strength in order to gain the advantage in capability after a cease fire.
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Figure 3.2. The Democratizing Warlord’s Dilemma
Cooperate (R) Defect (R)
Cooperate (G) Democracy Autocracy or War
Defect (G) Autocracy or War War
Walter (1997, 1999) suggests third party enforcement as a way of getting around the
commitment problems associated with the settlement. Such enforcement is also necessary
after the settlement has been reached. This not only requires that there be guarantees of
third party enforcement, but also that the settlement be enforced in order to help make
commitments credible throughout the early state-building process. This implies a peace-
keeping operation, but one that goes above and beyond the traditional definition of simply
policing a cease-fire. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that multi-dimensional peacekeeping
operations have a positive effect on post conflict democracy. These are missions in which
peacekeeping actors go beyond simply separating the combatants to enforce peace, but also
help to build infrastructure, take part in the delivery of goods and services, and monitor
elections. However, they explain their effectiveness as being a function of the conflict’s bat-
tlefield conditions, suggesting that such missions are necessary in the aftermath of only the
most intensive conflicts. I believe that such missions may be appropriate for almost any
civil war, if democracy is desired after it. These peacekeeping operations go well beyond
calming down former combatants to enforce a settlement. They may provide election mon-
itoring and infrastructure observation which can go a long way to making commitments
to democracy by the former warring actors credible. Having this kind of extensive third
party enforcement after a civil war is over may help greatly in helping actors gain enough
confidence in each other to democratize effectively. In Mozambique, such a mission was in
place, and some literature points to its success as helping to secure demobilization, observe
founding elections, and sustain the overall transition to democracy (Walter 1999; Manning
2001). In fact, Walter (1999) points to the extensive UN presence as the key factor in the
successful settlement of Mozambique’s civil war and subsequent transition. Walter (1999)
15
further points that the commitment level of conflict management actors is important. The
more willing conflict management actors are to fully do the job required of them, the more
likely the conflict actors will feel secure enough to credibly commit to peace. Thus missions
in which the peacekeeping actors are demonstrably committed to securing a long term peace
are more likely to be effective.
Suppose states in which there were civil wars that ended in a negotiated settlement
also have a an effective and extensive peacekeeping operation. Does that mean they will
necessarily have democracy? Not at all. How certain policies are put into place during the
post settlement phase is also crucial. I contend that the most important policy, prior to
the first election, is demobilization. Walter (1997) suggests that actors demobilize slowly,
since an immediate disarmament adds to actors’ insecurities. However, while this may be an
effective strategy for getting to the settlement, it has to be enforced strongly before the first
election. The credible commitment problem arises again. Suppose the two former warring
actors still have two separate armies and the new state holds an election. The winner is clear,
but the loser still has an army. There is very little incentive for this actor to admit defeat
and become the loyal opposition. What is more likely is to defect from the cooperation for
democracy and start the war again. In fact, this is exactly what happened in Angola in the
early 1990s (Paris 1997). After their founding elections following a civil war, in which there
were international peacebuilding operations and international observation, the peace process
broke down and the war started again. The loser of the election, the UNITA (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola2) rebel group, did not accept the results and
returned to war. Paris (1997) notes that observers pointed to a lack of full demobilization of
both groups. While a slower demobilization might be helpful early on in the peace process,
if states are trying to move from an uncertain political future with violence (civil war) to
an uncertain political future without violence (democracy), the tools that make civil war
possible must be severely weakened before democracy is to become a likely outcome.
2Translated from Portuguese in (Paris 1997).
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3.1.1. The International Environment
Thus far, the story presented is essentially a two player prisoner’s dilemma between the
former combatants with an external enforcer (peacekeepers) as the solution. However, if
more players join the game with a less than neutral agenda, then the game could change.
Cunningham (2006) notes that the more actors there are at the bargaining table, the less
likely a settlement is to be reached to end a civil war. The reason for this is that the more
divergent preferences that are present at the bargaining table, the smaller the bargaining
space is. After a civil war, the situation is similar. Even if there was a negotiated settlement
to end the war, neighboring states (or major powers) may have an interest in who gains power
after the war. Other states may not accept the uncertainty inherent in a democracy, believing
that an elected leader opposed to their international agenda could hurt them. So, if another
state intervenes in the negotiation process (militarily or otherwise), it could lead to the start
of a new war or a more certain institutional arrangement, such as autocracy. States that are
the most vulnerable to such interference from other states are those in which there was a
military intervention or those located in a “hostile” neighborhood. A hostile neighborhood
may reinforce the credible commitment problem. If a neighboring state is willing to sponsor
one of the former litigants in the civil war by providing arms, soldiers, or sanctuary, then
the former combatants may only be using the post war institutional negotiations to regain
strength and build their capabilities to win outright in a renewed conflict. Thus, a renewed
civil war seems more likely when states are part of a hostile neighborhood.
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) theorize that states that intervene in a civil war
may not encourage democracy because they do not have the willingness to help states along
because it could be detrimental with their own domestic audiences. Balch-Lindsay and
Enterline (2000) note that the presence of a military intervention is likely to extend the
duration of a conflict. Gibler (2007) shows that more peaceful neighborhoods are more
likely to encourage democratization and that settled borders are actually the reason for the
observed democratic peace. All of these works conform to the logic presented above. States
that are not involved in international crises are less likely to view domestic audiences as a
threat sympathetic to enemy states and, therefore, are less likely to repress (Poe and Tate
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1994). They are also less likely to see the formation of new or renewed rebellions based
in other states (Salehyan 2008). Thus, post civil war states that are part of a cooperative
international environment are more likely to have a wider bargaining space and are also more
likely to risk the uncertainty of democracy. A cooperative international environment is not
one in which democracy is necessarily likely, but one in which it is possible.
To summarize, post civil war democratization is not simply joint cooperation to agree
to become democratic. Nor is it as simple as the cooperation to settle the civil war in the
first place, as Wantchekon (2004) portrays it. Rather, it is a repeated game in which the
actors have to have enough confidence in the commitments of each other to keep playing the
game, over and over, until the elections are held and the winners take office. After a civil
war, this is incredibly difficult. It takes third party enforcement, but not in the limited sense
of just enforcing a peaceful settlement. Third party enforcement in a multi-dimensional
mission is helpful for the myriad of credible commitment problems that arise when these
actors are attempting to start a democratic state. However, conflict management timing
and enforcement also seem crucial. One major difference between the success of Mozambique
and the failure in Angola is that while both states had peacekeeping operations in place, one
enforced demobilization before the first election and the other did not. Not demobilizing
before the first election allows the loser of the first election to return to war when they feel
insecure about how the government will operate. Further, if a state is part of a cooperative
international environment, the bargaining space for institutional arrangements between the
former combatants is likely to be much larger and they are more likely to choose democracy.
3.2. Conditions for Post-Conflict Democracy: Hypotheses
This section derives specific hypotheses drawn from the theoretical story presented above.
It points to specific factors as affecting post civil war democratization, such as certain types
of peacekeeping operations, how the civil war ends, when demobilization happens, and specif-
ically what about the international environment is so important. I begin by discussing the
conditions that make democratization more or less likely. The first condition is that ne-
gotiated settlements make democracy more likely and outright victories make it less likely.
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Peacekeeping should make democracy more likely by helping to make commitments credi-
ble. Demobilization, if done before the first election, makes democracy more likely. If not
done properly, it could launch the state back into war. Finally, a cooperative international
environment, which if not in place could result in an autocracy or more war. I conclude
the section by discussing generally the control variables that need to be incorporated for the
empirical analysis that follows in subsequent chapters.
3.2.1. The Importance of a Negotiated Settlement
The second phase of Rustow’s democracy path is the conflict phase. Obviously, post
civil war states have gone through this already, albeit in a more extreme form than Rustow
originally conceived. His third phase, the decision phase, is the focus of this paper. Essen-
tially, I am in search of the conditions that make a democratic choice by conflict actors more
likely. Four major conditions emerge as necessary for democracy to be a viable political
option after a civil conflict. The first is some form of settlement between the warring actors.
Negotiated settlements are noted in the literature as the civil war conclusion most conducive
to post-war peace, better human rights performance and an increasing level of democracy
(Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Poe et al. 2005;
Gurses and Mason 2006). The settlement is important because during the war, one side
could not completely dominate the other. The government could not effectively maintain a
monopoly on the use of force, and the rebels could not effectively overthrow the government.
Therefore, it is necessary for the two sides to settle in order to end the war. Power sharing
is implied by a negotiated settlement. A transition to democracy is thus natural from a ne-
gotiated settlement to end the war. Democracy, which can be conceived as an institutional
way of resolving political conflicts non-violently, seems the most likely course of action after
a negotiated settlement. After a military victory by either a rebel group or the government,
there is very little incentive to open the political system up and accommodate those with
whom the victor was recently at war. Research on repression and political violence points out
that the government, when faced with a domestic political crises, essentially has the choice
to accommodate or to repress. Likewise, opposition groups also have the choice to become
violent or remain peaceful. Once a civil war has begun, though, both parties have made the
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choice to become violent against one another, and accommodation is essentially gone as an
option until a stalemate occurs in the conflict. Once a military victory is achieved, however,
and the enemy is disposed of, then it seems less likely that a victor would share power with
anyone. Thus:
Hypothesis 1. Post civil war states established though a negotiated settle-
ment are more likely to result in a democracy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.2. The Need for Credible Commitments
In addition to having some form of a settlement to end the war to encourage a permanent
settlement (i.e. democracy), the settlement has to be viable. There is a need in post civil
war states for credible commitments to a stable peace, in order for that stable peace to
transition to a democracy. Fearon (1995), in his explanation of the outbreak of war3, notes
that one factor that leads to the outbreak of violence is the lack of credible commitments in
the international system. This is also problematic in a post civil war environment, even after
a negotiated settlement. Without incentives or assurance that each actor will keep their end
of the peace settlement, the end of violence is not guaranteed. Without an effective end of
the violence, democracy is simply not a viable option.
However, once the ability of actors to make credible commitments is introduced, the
likelihood of an eventual transition to democracy increases. Credible commitments in the
peacebuilding process over a range of issues allows for an extension of the future for coop-
eration between the government and former rebels, rather than making it a simple one shot
game in which actors can more easily defect (Axelrod 1984; Walter 1997, 1999). If the two
sides can successfully settle their conflict, then they may also be able to set up institutions
that essentially make the settlement permanent via democracy.
There are a few ways, in a post civil war environment, in which credible commitments
can become possible. One is through a neutral external actor, such as a peacekeeping force.
Peacekeeping, sometimes derided for its perceived lack of success is fostering permanent set-
tlements to violence between states and inside states, is usually treated as a black box by
3While Fearon is actually describing the outbreak of interstate war, it can easily be understood as being
between two actors in a situation of state failure, as in a civil war or immediately after a civil war.
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the literature. Some works have only looked at the presence or absence of any type missions
to test their effect (Poe et al. 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006)rather than looking at specific
mission dynamics, such as mission duration (Greig and Wright 2006), or mission type (Doyle
and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). The major goal of peacekeeping missions is to secure the
peace by instilling confidence on both sides by providing information to ensure that the com-
mitments and actions taken by either side conform to the settlement (Diehl 1993, 5-7). The
debate in the literature on peacekeeping centers around the effectiveness of peacekeepers.
Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that in certain contexts, peacekeeping has a positive effect
upon peace duration. They also show that multi-dimensional peacekeeping forces, which
can help to build an infrastructure and monitor the founding elections, are helpful in not
only keeping a state peaceful for a period of time, but also in promoting democracy. Fortna
(2003; 2004) also shows that on the whole, peacekeeping helps to promote longer periods of
peace. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) indicate that settlements with third party
enforcement are more likely to endure. Greig and Diehl (2005), however, examine peacekeep-
ing more pessimistically, noting that it may simply provide an opportunity for combatants
to replenish their strengths and begin fighting again. This is a separate problem from that
of credible commitments, which is the problem of the incentive to misrepresent actual ca-
pabilities in order to gain an advantage in the conflict (Fearon 19954). Empirically, Gurses
and Mason (2006) shows that UN presence does not significantly improve democracy levels
at year five or year ten after the fighting stops.
Essentially, however, much of the literature that focuses on the effectiveness of peace-
keeping does not speak of ways in which certain missions may be “better” than others nor do
they seek to explain the quality of peacekeeping through mission dynamics themselves. The
literature that does treat mission types separately focuses on the mandate of the mission
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), but not the intensity of interest with which peace-
keepers operated. Walter (1999) notes that in order for peacekeeping to really be successful,
the actors in the conflict must believe that the peacekeepers can be effective. She notes that
4Fearon’s (1995) work is actually about actors in interstate conflict. However, the logic of his argument
has been applied in previous works for civil conflict (Walter 1997, 1999).
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“if groups are uncertain whether peacekeepers will arrive, if they do not believe that peace-
keepers can effectively verify compliance or protect them as they report to assembly areas,
or if they are not convinced that peacekeepers will stay until demoblization is complete,
then their role as a reassuring device will be undercut, and it seems highly unlikely that
implementation will succeed,”(Walter 1999, 154). In a response to this problem of knowing
whether or not peacekeeping operations do sustain until demobilization, Greig and Wright
(2006) examine the likelihood that certain peacekeeping operations are more “committed”
than others to peace in a civil war. That work found that there are certain factors that con-
tribute to some peacekeeping missions lasting until the end of the civil conflict. For instance,
we found that UN missions, missions led by major powers, and missions in which there are
already cease-fires are more likely to sustain until the end of the civil war. For my purposes
here, only the missions that stayed until the end of the civil war are of interest. Earlier works
(Poe, Mason, Colley, and Quinn 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006), use only a simple dummy
variable indicating the presence of UN peacekeeping operations. Greig and Wright (2006)
demonstrate that peacekeeping is much more complicated than can be appropriately repre-
sented by a simple present or not present dummy variable, and a variable that represents
the quality of peacekeeping should be taken into account. Missions deemed “sustained” by
Greig and Wright (2006) will be missions that have a much greater influence on what form
the institutions of post civil wars states will assume than those that did not sustain until
the end of the conflict. Such missions instill more confidence between the actors and should
also help to give rise to credible commitments. Thus, such peacekeeping efforts should also
make democratic institutional choice more likely. Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), with an increased scope of the mission, should also
be helpful in getting actors to democratize after the conflict. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. The presence of a multi-dimensional peacebuilding operation
should make it more likely for a post civil war state to choose democracy,
ceteris paribus.
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Hypothesis 2a. The presence of a “sustained” peacemaking operation to
help settle the conflict should make it more likely that a post civil war
state will choose democracy, ceteris paribus.
3.2.3. Demobilization
Two other conditions make both a stable peace and democracy more likely after a civil
war. Demobilization is the disarming of litigants throughout the state, which is sometimes
followed by their integration into the new government’s army. This process, if properly im-
plemented, makes a relapse into conflict less likely. One of the advantages post civil war
states have in maintaining more lasting peace over post-interstate war regions is the fact
that demobilization ostensibly should remove the warmaking capacity of one of the former
combatants, leaving one army instead of two or more. Situations in which former rebels are
also integrated into the army also provide them with a stake in the new government, inde-
pendent of the electoral process. That should reduce the ability of and incentive for former
rebels to remobilize. By offering the former rebels jobs as soldiers in the new regime, the new
government removes some of the private incentive to return to violence. By giving former
rebels a stake in the state independent of the electoral process, it also makes remobilization
less likely even if the former rebels lose electorally. It also prevents complete control of the
army by the former government actors, and thus could make recognition of elections more
likely should the former government actors lose. This joint stake in the future state that
is achieved independently of election results helps build confidence between former warring
actors as to their commitment to a peaceful settlement. The literature disagrees about how
demobilization should proceed. Walter (1997) suggests a slower demobilization, letting the
conflict actors feel more secure as the peace agreement is enforced. However, I contend that
demobilization needs to be at least strongly enforced by the time the first election happens.
Otherwise, states may suffer the same fate as Angola, in which rebels who were not disarmed
took up fighting again after they lost the election. Disarming slowly may be a good idea,
but it seems that it needs to be accomplished before the uncertainty of the first elections to
force compliance with results.
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Hypothesis 3. Successful demobilization before the first election make de-
mocratization more likely in post civil war states, ceteris paribus.
3.2.4. Cooperative International Environment
A cooperative international environment, though one of the most difficult concepts to
specify, is also crucial for post civil war democratization. Though not part of the theoretical
outline of credible commitments to peace and democracy, this concept nonetheless deserves
some attention. Very few civil wars are between only in-state actors. Salehyan (2008) notes
that the second leading cause for a militarized interstate dispute is actually rooted in a
civil war. When a third party intervenes, it is typically on one side or another, pursuing
its own interests for one side to win. While I believe that a third party that is actually
neutral should make democratization more likely by providing credible commitments, the
entrance of a third party into a conflict introduces much uncertainty into the mix after the
conflict is over. Third parties could continue to support rebel movements or help to prop up
repressive governments after the end of the conflict. Thus, it seems necessary for post civil
war states to be in an international environment that is supportive (or at least not openly
hostile) to democracy. The absence of hostile international actors should provide for more
credible commitments and a lack of remoblization if there is no external funding for violence
or repression.
There is a multitude of literature that examines how the international system and the
spread of democracy interact. From the massive literature on the democratic peace, to
democratic norm cascades, to the influence of the end of the Cold War, there is little doubt
that there is some connection between the characteristics of the international system and
domestic transitions to democracy. To some degree, all of the forces mentioned above are
at play when states choose institutions in the aftermath of a civil war. The end of the
Cold War, used by some (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) as a proxy for external funding of rebel
groups, is likely to have an impact. Though it cannot be directly linked to funding for rebel
groups the way that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest, the Cold War was a period when
the major powers were less concerned about the institutional make-up of an ally country
than the stance it took in the bipolar competition. This is not the same as funding rebel
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groups, though that is one form of intervention the major powers took during the Cold War
(Huntington 1991; Blanton 2005). They also propped up and even encouraged autocratic
regimes if they were allies (Blanton 2005).
Hypothesis 4. Post civil war states after the Cold War are more likely to
choose democratic institutions than post civil war state during the Cold
War, ceteris paribus.
The effects of the Cold War really only apply to major power stakes in post civil war
institutions. They do not adequately speak to the interests of other regional actors in what
types of post conflict states emerge. Many of the supporters of either rebels or the government
during a civil war were not major powers or proxies for them, but were simply neighbors of
the states in conflict. Gibler (2007), in his take on the democratic peace, notes that it is not
actually joint democracy between states that produces democracy, but rather that that joint
peace (in the form of settled borders) that produces democratic-dominant regions. He draws
from older literature (Moore 1966) on democratization, noting that if states have to mobilize
societies to fight wars internationally, then they are more likely to repress domestically (Poe
and Tate 1994), hindering the chances that states will transition into full-fledged democracies.
Because civil wars can spread into international wars (Salehyan 2008), interstate conflicts
could greatly hinder the ability of a post civil war state to democratize.
Hypothesis 5. Post civil war states are less likely to democratize during
periods of international crisis, ceteris paribus.
3.2.5. “National Unity”, Identity Conflicts, and Structural Conditions: Control Variables
Rustow (1971) describes the process of democratization. He argues that in order for
democratization to occur a state must go through three phases. The first, which is really
more of a pre-condition more than a phase, is national unity. This pre-condition is rather
problematic for post civil war cases. The way Rustow describes the issue, he implies that
the potential democratizers must agree that they are one people essentially. Many countries
do not meet this pre-condition. Lijphart (1999) describes institutional arrangements that
are very effective for democracy to be consolidated for states that are divided. What I think
is necessary is not national unity so much as agreed upon issues of contention and an agreed
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upon concept of what the state is. This means that the actors are competing for governing
the same space. If an actor does not want to be a part of the state at all, or is only concerned
with governance in one region, then they violate national unity. By agreed upon issues of
contention, I refer to the condition whereby the potential democratizing actors are competing
over the same policy space. They do not have to agree on how best to manage the issues
at stake, but simply agree on what those issues are. This modified version of Rustow’s pre-
condition is particularly problematic for states emerging out of an irredentist or separatist
conflict, or identity conflicts more broadly. These conflicts are out of step completely with
the pre-condition. First, such conflicts are organized around whether a region should even
be a part of the state. Thus, there is no agreement on what the state is or should be (Toft
2003). Secondly, the issues of contention (independence, federalism) are not likely to be
part of the national political discussion, and instead are focused upon only the region itself.
Separatist leaders are simply not concerned with what is going on in the capital, except to
the degree that what goes on there affects their region. Unless the issues are nullified via
some federal institutional arrangement, or autonomy is agreed to, then it seems that states
emerging out of separatist conflicts may not be able to settle into a democracy. Further,
countries that are fractionalized ethnically may be problematic for democracy, especially in
a state with a history of ethnic repression. Both the factors of ethnic/identity wars and
ethnic fractionalization are cultural demographic factors that I control for in testing in order
to better distinguish the effect of process variables developed in the hypotheses.
I further control for structural conditions such as economic development, which has been
shown over and over to be associated with democracy. I also control for concepts similar to
those presented in the theory to better isolate the effect of the specific concepts presented in
the theory. I control for any and all peacekeeping operations in order to make sure that spe-
cific types of missions are actually causing any effect. I also control for military powersharing
pacts in negotiated settlements in order to better distinguish the effect of demobilization.
Including these concepts as part of the empirical model should more accurately reveal the
effects of the specific processes that are emphasized in the theory.
26
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
In order to test the question of what factors contribute to democratic transitions, there are
some different research design options that could have been implemented. Gurses and Mason
(2006) employ an OLS regression for the change in the level of democracy (as measured by
Polity) at years five and ten after the civil war ends. While my dependent variable is
essentially a choice to “go democratic” by leaders, I could simply employ a logit analysis at
years five and ten after the war ended, keeping in line with previous works that study post
conflict democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, I deviate from this because I
believe that the decision to measure the level of democracy at year five or year ten is rather
arbitrary. Testing the model at five years and ten years gives one some understanding of
the medium to long term impact of the variables, but it does not show exactly how states
got to their five and ten year levels of democracy. The studies by Gurses and Mason (2006)
and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) are really trying to gauge the long-term impact of the
characteristics of the civil war (Gurses and Mason 2006) and the long-term impact of certain
international policies like multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis
(2000). Those research designs employed by those authors do provide some indication of long-
term impacts. My study, however, is interested in what gets states to democracy in the first
place and is not concerned with whether or not they are democratic after a certain amount
of time. Thus, a research design similar to those previous studies would be inappropriate.
I choose instead to employ a duration model, or event history analysis, to determine
what makes the choice of democracy more likely in any given year of peace after the civil
war ends (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). For some countries the decision could come
sooner rather than later. While five years is probably enough time to have elections and get
a realistic take on what the level of democracy might be, such an approach has problems
accounting for how factors, before a transition, affect the choice. A duration analysis will
allow one to determine more specifically which factors impact the level of democracy before
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it actually becomes a democracy. A model with snapshots of arbitrarily determined years
after a war ends might not actually help to gauge what causes transitions to democracy. A
duration model would measure the likelihood that a democracy emerges at any given year.
This should give a clearer understanding of which factors impact the choice for democracy
before a transition occurs.
4.1. Data: Case Selection and Choice of Analysis
For my case selection, I choose the post war peace country-years as contained in the
Gurses and Mason (2006) dataset, which was compiled out of the Doyle and Sambanis
(2000) data. Their data set contained all country-peace years from 1947-1999, with ninety
countries included in their analysis, and over 1300 country years. Their set includes the
Polity scores for each country, and from that I code my dependent variable. Their data
also contains some of the control variables employed, such as GDP per capita (for level of
economic development), whether or not the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement, and
whether or not the conflict was an ethnic war.
The analysis is an event history analysis, also called a duration model or a hazard model.
This means that it runs a model that predicts for some type of “failure.” Each subject (a
case in a regression model) in the model is the post civil war peace period. My subjects
begin with the end of a civil war in a country and lasts until the peace ends. The hazard
model is testing for the achievement of democracy. Once a subject reaches the threshold for
democracy in the model, it is dropped out of the analysis. This removes the possibility that
an individual case will become democratic twice in the analysis. Thus, only factors that
help predict the achievement of the democratic standard for the specific model will emerge
as significant.
Specifically, the duration model I employ is a Cox model. The Cox model, as opposed
to the Weibull model (employed in Greig and Wright 2006), does not assume a duration
dependence, which is to say it does not assume that a failure is more or less likely to occur
as time goes on, which a Weibull model does (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). I have no
theoretical reason to assume that as time goes on democracy is more or less likely to emerge,
leaving it up to the variables to determine the shape of the hazard function.
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For my event history analysis, I employ two models for two different standards of democ-
racy. The first model tests the choice of democracy at level five or higher on the Polity scale
(Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The second model tests the choice of democracy with a higher
standard, seven or higher on the Polity scale. A standard of five has been used before in
civil war studies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). A standard of seven or higher
is noted in human rights literature (Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif 2005) as
being one in which the benefits of democracy, such as respect for personal integrity rights,
are received by the population. Below, I outline the differences between the two standards.
4.2. Operationalization of the Variables
4.2.1. Democracy
For this paper, a democracy is conceptualized under a limited institutional definition.
A democracy is a set of institutions that are elected, have a constrained executive, and
multiparty competition. Operationally, this definition is contained in the Polity IV project
(Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The Polity IV dataset provides scales in which countries are
scored from negative ten to zero for their autocratic tendencies and a zero to ten for their
democratic tendencies. The polity score is an aggregated twenty-one point scale ranging
from negative ten to positive ten revealing a country’s overall “democraticness”. Democracy
scores in Polity are compiled by weighting certain major components of democracy. The four
major components are competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, the amount
of constraint on the executive, and the openness of political participation. The component
weighted the most heavily is executive constraint. An autocracy measure is also used to
get the overall Polity score. This measure is generated from four components as well. The
indicators are the same except that the autocracy score also takes into account how partici-
pation is regulated. The Polity score then is the overall score (democracy score - autocracy
score). The standards I employ, five and seven, are then roughly scores of sixty percent
and eighty percent of the overall possible Polity scores achievable, respectively. There is no
explicitly listed difference between what makes a country a five and what makes one a seven.
However, the component measure given the most weight is the degree of executive constraint.
Therefore, it is quite likely that the major difference between a state that achieves a five and
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one that achieves a seven is that the executives are more constrained in the latter (Gleditsch
and Ward 1997).
Previous literature has taken on the question of unpacking the Polity scales to gain a
deeper understanding of what they mean. Gleditsch and Ward (1997) note that there are
several paths countries can take to receive certain scores. At one point in their research
they display ten different combinations of components that can achieve a score of six on the
democracy score. They also note that executive constraint in the single biggest predictor of
overall scores. They further note that Polity does not have its own threshold for when a state
becomes a democracy. Some civil war studies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003)
uses a standard of five or higher on Polity. Some other studies contend that while positive
scores on Polity indicate more democratic tendencies, states do not really see certain benefits
associated with democracies (like respect for human rights) until they reach a threshold. In
my study, consistent with previous literature (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005), that threshold
is over a six on the Polity scale. I use both a score of five or higher and a score of seven
or higher. A score of seven may indicate a full achievement of democracy, but a five is (I
believe) indicative of leaders making the choice to become democracies. Since these states
are essentially new states created out of the ashes of a civil war, a five may also be a more
appropriate expectation. Thus in my analysis, I am using two duration models to predict
the likelihood that in any given post conflict peace year that a state will reach the threshold
of five or higher on Polity in the first model and whether or not they reach a seven or higher
in the second model.
4.2.2. Specification and Operationalization of Causal Variables
The major causal variables specified by the hypotheses are: how the civil war ended,
credible commitments via sustained peacemaking operations before the war ends and multi-
dimensional peacebuilding operations after a settlement is reached, demobilization before
the first election, and the hostility of a state’s international environment. How the war
ended is measured with a series of dichotomous variables taken from the Gurses and Mason
(2006)data which codes negotiated settlements, rebel victories, and government victories.
I include in the model both the dummies for negotiated settlements and rebel victories,
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leaving government victories as the reference category. This allows a test for whether the
two different military victories might have different effects on the probability of democratic
transitions, though both types of outright victory should be less likely to produce democracy
than negotiated settlements.
The coding scheme for sustained peacemaking missions is taken from Greig and Wright
(2006), which used the Mullenbach and Dixon (2006) third party intervention data. Sus-
tained missions are the operations in which peacekeepers intervened while fighting was still
ongoing and continued their mission through the end of the civil war. These missions make
credible commitments to democracy more likely after the civil war because in those states
that had these missions, conflict actors are more likely to have confidence in the third party
guarantees, thus making them more likely to want to commit to democracy (Walter 1999).
Termination of the civil war was taken (in Greig and Wright (2006)) from the Fearon and
Laitin (2003) work which has a civil war ending with demoblization, outright victory, or
settlement followed by two years of peace. This variable was the failure variable of interest
in the previous study (Greig and Wright 2006), so in order to code the presence of such mis-
sions (coded as a one for sustainable, zero for everything else), I code a one for each country
that had such a mission in place and a zero for the ones that did not have the sustainable
missions. This is a cross-sectional variable that does not gauge what year such a mission
ended, or how long it stayed, but merely whether or not a country had such a mission before
the war ended.
Multi-dimensional peacebuilding missions are the type that receive a lot of emphasis in
Doyle and Sambanis (2000). These are the missions that go beyond just security and enforce-
ment of peace agreements and help to build infrastructure, observe elections, and contribute
to statebuilding. The data for these mission types are taken from Fortna (2004), who includes
all multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations, not simply those carried out by the United
Nations. These were coded as anything above a three on Fortna’s peacekeeping scale, which
includes multi-dimensional missions as well as Chapter VII enforcement missions. Having
both of these included in this one variable captures the most extensive of missions. This
variable is also a cross-sectional dichotomous measure, coded with a one for countries that
had such missions, and a zero for countries that did not have such missions.
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Demobilization before the first election, is drawn by examining all of the states in the
dataset using Keesing’s archives and various other sources. My theory emphasized not that
there is some notion of demobilization as a part of the settlement, but that it is enforced
before the first election to make commitments to election results more credible and to help
prevent the resumption of the war. Thus, I employ a dichotomous measure of demobiliza-
tion enforcement and code a one for states in which disarmament was strongly enforced
before the first election, and a zero for every other country. The details of the coding pro-
cess for this variable are included in Appendix A, along with a list of all of the states in
which demobilization was completed before the first election. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003),
in their study of military power sharing, have data for which negotiated settlements have
provisions for military power sharing, which includes disarmament and integration into one
army. However, their data do not discriminate between those that were enforced fully by
the first election and those that were not. I control for military power sharing in the model,
however, to gauge the independent effect of demobilization timing.
The concept of a cooperative international environment is operationalized with two vari-
ables: the cold war, and the level of international hostility during the post civil war peace
period. Cold War is simply a dummy variable coded one for all years before 1988 for all
countries. I chose 1988 because it was during that year that the Soviet Union announced its
pullout of Eastern Europe, signaling a much less direct Soviet foreign policy (Keller 1988).
For the level of international hostility, I chose to use a common measure of interstate hos-
tility, which is the presence of a militarized interstate dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer
2004). These data are taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute 3 dataset, put together
from the Correlates of War project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Any year in which
a state experienced a MID with a hostility level of three or greater, I code as a one, and
all years that did not were coded as a zero. I chose the level of three or greater because
a level three indicates an actual display of force. A level one indicates some form of crisis,
but no militarized action. A level two contains threats, but again no action. Thus, level
three indicates some actual observable military hostility. I predict that such MID periods
are much less likely to yield democratic transitions because governments tend to not tolerate
much opposition during periods of international conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Gibler 2007).
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4.2.3. Specification and Operationalization of Control Variables
The theory presented earlier included a number of control variables that must be included
to have a fully specified model. Among these is a variable for identity wars, a variable taken
from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Their coding is a dichotomous variable, with a score of
one indicating such wars and a zero otherwise. This variable is to get at the concept of
national unity in Rustow (1970), in which actors that disagree about the nature of the state
and who should be included are less likely to agree to democratize. The level of economic
development is measured as GDP per capita, transformed into its natural logarithm. Ethnic
fractionalization is simply the proportion of the population of the largest ethnic group from
Fearon (2002)1. All of the above variables were taken from the Gurses and Mason (2006)
data.
The other control variables contained within the analysis are any peacekeeping opera-
tions, military powersharing in the negotiated settlements, and military interventions. The
purpose of having the peacekeeping control is to test whether there is an independent effect
found for sustained peacemaking operations and multi-dimensional peacebuilding opera-
tions. The data for this variable are taken from Fortna (2004), which contains a simple
dummy variable for whether or not a country experienced any type of peacekeeping, again
a cross-sectional variable. Further, since some of the missions that were “sustained” did not
necessarily have a presence in the post war period, I added all observations from the sustained
peacemaking variable to the peacekeeping control. This better captures the independent ef-
fects of any peacekeeping versus the effect of sustained missions only. Military powersharing
is a dummy variable that indicates whether a country had military powersharing as part
of its negotiated settlement. These data are taken from Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). The
purpose of this variable is to gauge whether or not the independent effect of demobilization
before the first election is truly independent, or simply a function of having power-sharing as
part of the settlement. I further control for whether or not a third party intervened militarily
on one side or the other during the civil war. This is to better proxy the international envi-
ronment. Previous works (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Cunningham 2006) show that
1Also used in Fearon and Latin (2003).
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civil wars last longer the more actors are involved. Cunningham (2006) shows that the more
actors involved also decreases the bargaining space. After a civil war, a multitude of actors
involved in the bargaining over institutional choices may lessen the chances that democratic
institutions are an equilibrium outcome. The data for this variable, military intervention,
comes from the Correlates of War project (2000). I code a one for all states that had such
interventions and a zero for the rest.
4.3. Model Specification
To summarize, I run two models with two different dependent variables. Each of the
models are specified in the same way. Each model includes the theoretically derived vari-
ables of: how the civil war ends, credible commitments via sustained peacemaking and multi-
dimensional peacebuilding, demobilization prior to the first election, and a hostile interna-
tional environment operationalized via the cold war and international crises. Each model also
includes the control variables of: economic development (GDP per capita), ethnic fractional-
ization, identity conflicts, any peacekeeping operations, and military powersharing presence
in the negotiated settlement. Table 4.1 summarizes the model, each variable’s coding scheme,
and the source for the data. Table 4.2 summarizes the major expectations with each variable
in the model.
4.4. Empirical Analysis
The first test I employ of factors that predict democracy after civil wars is a Cox hazard
model. It should be noted that I also ran tests using the Weibull hazard model2. The
major difference between the two estimation techniques is that the Weibull model assumes
monotonic duration dependence, which is to say that as time goes on, a failure is assumed to
be more or less likely. I have no theoretical reason to believe that as time goes on, democracy
is more or less likely. Therefore, while I estimated Weibull results, I do not feel they are
appropriate for my theory. The Cox model makes no assumptions about time dependence.
The first Cox model is tested against the standard of democracy of a five or greater on the
2The results from the Weibull tests are presented in Appendix B.
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Table 4.1. The Model
Variable Coding Source
Democracy Dummy (≥ 7; ≥ 5) Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers
2005)
How the Civil War Ends Dummy Gurses and Mason (2006)
Sustained Peacemaking Op-
erations
Dummy Greig and Wright (2006); Mullen-






Dummy See Appendix A
Cold War Dummy (before 1988) None
Hostile International Envi-
ronment
Presence of MID ≥ 3 during
Peace Period (Dummy)
Correlates of War (Ghosn,
Palmer, Bremer 2004)
Control Variables Coding Source
Economic Development lnGDP Gurses and Mason (2006)
Ethnic Fractionalization Percent Share of Largest Group Gurses and Mason (2006); Fearon
and Laitin (2003)
Identity Wars Dummy Gurses and Mason (2006); Doyle
and Sambanis (2000)
Any Peacekeeping Dummy Fortna (2004); Greig and Wright
(2006); Mullenbach and Dixon
(2006)
Military Powersharing Dummy Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)
Military Intervention Dummy Correlates of War (Sarkees 2000)
polity scale. Each country is included for every year in their peace period until they either
reach the “failure” (in this case, democracy), the peace ends, or the dataset ends (in 1999).
Table 4.3 shows the results of the first test, with robust standard errors clustering on post
war peace periods. I report only the hazard ratios and not the coefficients due to ease of
interpretation. Coefficients in hazard models do not yield themselves to inference as well as
the hazard ratios, which are simply how many times more likely an event is to occur due to
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Demobilization before First Election Positive
Cold War Negative
Hostile International Environment Negative







the presence of an independent variable. To interpret these ratios, one should subtract one
from the ratio. Ratios less than one are negatively related to the variable of interest.
The results in Table 4.3 show that over the last fifty years, there were thirty-five post
civil war countries that became polity level five or greater democracies. The overall model
statistics of the χ2 tests indicate that the model is a good fit. Negotiated settlements to end
the civil war are significantly associated with post conflict democracy, as the theory predicted
and previous literature has shown (Wantchekon 2004, Gurses and Mason 2006). Negotiated
settlements determine the bargaining space over which institutional arrangement will be
decided after a civil war. The results indicate that states that had a negotiated settlement
are about three and half times more likely to become democracies than states whose war
ended with an outright government victory. Demobilization also has a profound effect on
post civil war democratization. The results indicate that countries that demobilize before the
first election are about ninety percent more likely to democratize than countries that do not.
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Table 4.3. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity ≥ 5
Variable Hazard Ratio [S.E.] P-Value (2-tailed)
Negotiated Settlement 4.665 [2.609]*** 0.006
Rebel Victory 1.224 [0.590] 0.675











Economic Development 1.572 [0.276]*** 0.010
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.498 [0.352] 0.324
Identity Wars 0.820 [0.301] 0.589
Any Peacekeeping 2.573 [1.382]** 0.078
Military Powersharing 0.517 [0.262]* 0.192
Military Intervention 0.219 [0.123]*** 0.007
Subjects: 95; Failures: 35 N= 751 1-Tailed Significance: *=0.10,
**=0.05, ***=0.01
Wald χ2: 89.35; p> χ2: 0.0000
Military power-sharing agreements have a significant negative effect, however. The analysis
shows that states that had such agreements are about fifty percent less likely to democratize
than states that did not have such an agreement. This result is slightly puzzling, since these
two variables are conceptually related. One possible inference to draw from this is that an
agreement on military powersharing is ineffective so long as it is not enforced, and that the
timing of such a policy is important. This confirms some of the findings of Mukherjee (2006)
about the weakness of power sharing agreements emerging out of negotiated settlements.
Economic development is also significantly associated with post war democracy, a well noted
finding throughout most of the democratization literature.
Neither sustained peacemaking missions or multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations
show any significant effect, but the peacekeeping control does. This may be due to an
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issue of multi-collinearity between sustained peacemaking operations and the peacekeeping
control. They correlate at roughly seventy percent. In order to get at whether or not
there is any independent effect of sustained peacemaking, I estimated two other models
with this standard of democracy in which the peacekeeping control is removed in one and
sustained peacemaking is removed in the other. The results of these tests, presented in
Appendix B, show that when the peacekeeping control is removed, sustained peacemaking
operations are significant. If sustained peacemaking is removed, the peacekeeping control
retains its significance. The major inference I draw from the results of the separate tests
is that peacekeeping matters, but I am unable to infer that specific mission characteristics
have any independent effect. This inference, while not confirming my specific hypotheses
about peacekeeping, does confirm the idea that credible commitments do arise out of external
enforcement. The positive influence of peacekeepers goes beyond monitoring and enforcing
a cease-fire agreement, but also helps states to democratize.
Finally, though hostile international environment and the cold war variables show no
significant effect, military intervention does. The results show that states that had an out-
side military intervention into their civil war are almost one and half times less likely to
democratize. Military interventions into civil wars indicate a limited bargaining space that
arises out of hostile external actors. So, while the specific variables that emerged out of the
hypotheses did not appear significant, the fact that military interventions has a significant
negative impact upon post civil war democratization indicates that a hostile international
environment is detrimental to democratization.
As a robustness check on the above results, I also tested for states reaching level seven
or higher on Polity. Table 4.4 shows the results of the Cox model for this standard. It also
reports only the hazard ratios, with robust standard errors clustered on peace periods. At
first glance, the model also has a highly significant χ2 statistic. This model shows twenty-six
failures of the ninety five subjects.
These results largely confirm the findings in the first test, but with two key differences.
Like in the first test, negotiated settlements, economic development, the peacekeeping con-
trol, military powersharing, and interventions are significant and in the same direction, with
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Table 4.4. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity ≥ 7
Variable Hazard Ratio [S.E.] P-Value (2-tailed)
Negotiated Settlement 5.349 [3.153]*** 0.004
Rebel Victory 1.410 [0.939] 0.605











Economic Development 1.732 [0.407]*** 0.019
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.440 [0.376] 0.337
Identity Wars 0.759 [0.366] 0.568
Any Peacekeeping 4.007 [2.635]** 0.035
Military Powersharing 0.436 [0.240]* 0.132
Military Intervention 0.125 [0.088]*** 0.003
Subjects: 95; Failures: 26 N= 821 1-Tailed Significance: *=0.10,
**=0.05, ***=0.01
Wald χ2: 44.14; p> χ2: 0.0000
similar effects. The major differences between the results presented in this test and those
in the first model are the results for two theoretical variables, demobilization and a hostile
international environment. Demobilization is nowhere near significant in predicting whether
a state becomes a level seven democracy. However, if a state experiences a militarized inter-
state dispute in a given year, it is about fifty percent less likely to be a seven or higher on
polity.
There are a few possible reasons why these results contradict the first model. Demobiliza-
tion may help with the choice to become a democracy (which a level five certain indicates),
but it may be that other factors, structural or otherwise, may influence the movement to-
ward a fuller democracy. The results on hostile international environment are particularly
interesting. As noted earlier, the major determinant of a higher Polity score is the degree of
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executive constraint (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). I also noted earlier that during an interna-
tional crises, states are more likely to repress their population (Poe and Tate 1994). Other
studies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) note that executive constraint is the component of
Polity that is the best predictor of a strong human rights performance. Drawing all of these
findings together, it may be that the states that reach level five are still able to repress their
population during periods of international crises, so that involvement in a MID would not
hinder a state’s ability to become a five. However, the repression that may happen during
an international crisis would prevent a state from achieving a score of seven or greater. This
confirms some of the ideas presented by Gibler (2007) that contends that democracy emerges
out of international peace.
4.5. Discussion of the Theory
While the empirical analysis does not clearly confirm the theory developed in this paper,
it does lend some credence to it. Every concept presented in the theory was significant in
some form. Specifically, hypothesis 1, which predicted that negotiated settlements would
be more likely to encourage democracy, is significant across all tests3. The results for the
peacekeeping control and military interventions are also significant. Those variables repre-
sent the concepts of credible commitments through international enforcement and a hostile
international environment, respectively. Demobilization had a strong impact on whether or
not a state achieved a democracy score of five, but did not impact the transition to a level
seven. Economic development, long associated with democracy, is also significant. Involve-
ment in a militarized interstate dispute, conversely, had no impact on a state becoming a
five, but was significant and negative for states becoming sevens. The difference between the
results for both models may have more to do with the characteristics of the Polity dataset
and criteria for achieving the respective scores. It does seem, though, that demobilization
does impact democratic choice, but not necessarily democratic achievement. Demobilization
may not actually mean that a state will become a full liberal democracy. However, it does
contribute to peace and stability by preventing remobilization, which helps to put states on
the right track to politics by peaceful means through a democratic government.
3It is also significant in both Weibull tests, see Appendix B
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There were some insignificant variables in the analysis, two of which deserve attention.
Specifically, neither identity conflicts or ethnic fractionalization has a significant impact on
democratization. The fact that these two variables are not associated with democratization
may mean that ethnic divisions simply are not a major hindrance to democratization that
some literature (Horowitz 1985) has suggested.
Table 4.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses and which ones are confirmed by the
statistical analysis. Overall, the theory cannot be confirmed nor dismissed completely. But,
the results do indicate strong evidence that the concepts presented in the theory do have a
strong impact on whether or not a state becomes a democracy after a civil war. The most
robust finding is that negotiated settlements are much more likely to lead to democracy than
an outright victory. Conflict management (through some form of peacekeeping) and demo-
bilization before the first election also contribute to democracy, while a hostile international
environment prevents states from becoming democracies.
Table 4.5. Summary of Results
Hypothesis Confirmed?
1. Negotiated Settlements Confirmed
2a. Multi-Dimensional Peacebuilding Not Confirmed
2b. Sustained Peacemaking Not Confirmed
3. Demobilization Partially Confirmed
4. Cold War Not Confirmed




This thesis addressed the question of what determines democratization in the wake of
a civil war. The question is of interest both theoretically and from a policy standpoint.
Theoretically, it is interesting because it takes asks how states can go from the most chaotic
form of politics, a civil war, in which anarchy is the rule into the most open and peaceful
form of politics, democracy, in which opposing sides on policy debate each other and winners
and losers are determined absent violence. It is quite a transition indeed.
The theoretical approach that I took combines rationalist works surrounding the peace
process with process theories of democratization. The story is about the decision leaders
make after a civil war and not about structural or cultural components of the polity. It
conceptualizes post civil war democratization as largely a function of the peace process. The
major dilemma is getting the former litigants to credibly commit not only to peace but to
an institutional arrangement that introduces permanent uncertainty and cooperation. After
a civil war, when both sides have been shooting at each other, this is a very difficult task.
However, I predicted that if certain conditions were in place, democracy would become more
likely. A negotiated settlement to end to conflict should make democracy more likely. If
the litigants can cooperate to end the conflict, they are more likely to cooperate to adopt
democratic institutions, preferring that neither side take complete control of the state to the
other side taking complete control. Committed conflict management, through the form of
peacekeeping operations, should instill confidence in the former litigants to cooperate with
each other for democracy. Demobilization before the first election should also contribute to
democratization since it takes away the warmaking ability of former litigants and essentially
forces them to accept election results rather than return to organized violence. A coop-
erative international environment was also thought to contribute to democracy. If states
are not mobilizing their citizenry for an external threat, they are much less likely to crack
down and repress the citizenry. Also, a cooperative international environment is much less
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likely to support potential rebellions or to interfere with the internal workings the would be
democratizing state.
I conducted an event history analysis for two different standards of democracy. The
results confirmed that negotiated settlements can lead to democratization after a civil war.
They also confirmed that the other concepts developed in the theory play an important role
in post civil war democratization. Peacekeeping showed a significant positive impact upon
democratization. Demobilization also showed significant and positive as a predictor of post
civil war democratization. Further, a hostile international environment hinders the ability
of states to go democratic after a civil war. The empirical tests also confirmed that eco-
nomic development, as is well shown throughout democratization literature, is significantly
associated with democratic transitions. Cultural factors, such as ethnic fractionalization and
ethnic wars, showed no significant impact on democratization. Overall, the theory developed
in this paper received support empirically.
5.1. Direction of Future Research
This paper has shown that more attention needs to be devoted to international factors
and how they affect post civil war transitions. Specifically, this work shows the need to in-
corporate a more dynamic understanding of how international phenomena like peacekeeping
operations and conflict management policy timing can influence post war political decisions.
The bulk of the previous literature on peacekeeping tends to look at peacekeeping operations
as sort of a black box that are either present or not (Gurses and Mason, 2006; Poe et al.,
2005). Peacekeeping actors are political actors as well, and their decisions to stay the course
of the entire mission have shown in this analysis to have an influence on post war institutional
choice (Greig and Wright, 2006; Mullenbach, 2005). A more complete understanding of how
conflict management actors influence domestic decision making is needed. Doyle and Sam-
banis (2000) treat multi-dimensional peacebuilding as being a function of conflict conditions,
as though peacekeeping actors will automatically match a mission to a conflict. However,
it seems more likely that the actors responsible for conflict management, such as the UN or
regional organizations, are making a political calculation when they decide how many troops
are necessary and what mission type is needed. Future work should address this hole in the
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literature. Though the only significant peacekeeping variable associated with post civil war
democratization was the “black box” treatment, the insignificance of the two more dynamic
peacekeeping variables may be a result of either multi-collinearity or the crudeness of the
data. If a more precise dataset for all of the variables was coded, perhaps the timing of
conflict management policies and the importance of conflict management dynamics would
reveal themselves.
Development on how conflict management policies are carried out should also be encour-
aged. I took one step toward this by coding the completion of demobilization before the first
election. The question of why former combatants demobilize at all, given their insecurities
after a civil war, is an interesting research question in its own right. Other policies, such as
infrastructure rebuilding and police training, could also have a dramatic impact upon how
states recover from the devastation of a civil war. These topics deserve more attention in
the future.
Further developments should also focus on other international factors, such as the influ-
ence of mediation processes, military interventions on one side or the other of the civil war,
and foreign aid distributions for one side or the other. Who is intervening, providing shelter
to rebels, or mediating in the conflict may have a very significant effect on post civil war
arrangements. Finally, other international phenomena such as refugee flows are indicated
by previous literature to have an impact on the dynamics of civil conflict, and should be
recognized as this project moves forward (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). While this thesis
touches on some of these concepts, they are treated rather crudely in the analysis. More
precise measurements of the actions of external forces should be developed and more data
needs to be collected.
The subject of this project is also very limited. Further work should also be done that
focuses upon other institutional arrangements that are possible after a civil war. Democracy
is but one of many options that leaders face. An interesting question would be to theorize
what makes dictatorships more likely after a civil war, or why elites choose oligarchic power
sharing pacts rather than opt for the uncertainty of democracy. Understanding the answers
to these questions could add greatly to our field’s understanding of how international factors
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could affect domestic politics and what impact such institutional choices could have upon
the international environment.
The research field that focuses on civil wars and post civil war politics is fundamentally
interesting. It deals with some of the major questions in political science: war, institutions
and institutional development, the interaction between international and domestic politics,
and democracy. The basic questions of politics have to be answered by these leaders after
the end of a conflict. The state must be rebuilt and the question of who gets what, when,
and how is fundamental to the post civil war statebuilding process. This paper is a step in
the right direction of linking international politics and policies to life in states after a civil
war ends. However, this research project, like any other, is not complete and much more





CODING RULES FOR DEMOBILIZATION 
APPENDIX A
CODING RULES FOR DEMOBILIZATON
To create this variable, I had to code data originally. The work by Hartzell and Hoddie
(2003) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) provided a starting point. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)
code military powersharing as part of a negotiated settlement. That variable is included in
my analysis as a control variable. In order to gain a more precise estimate of the importance
of policy timing and because I believe that disarmament is the most important part of a
military powersharing agreement, I had to code for enforcement as well. Hoddie and Hartzell
(2003) do code for whether or not a military powersharing agreement was partially, fully, or
never implemented. However, these military powersharing agreements cover a wide range
of issues, not just disarmament. They can cover everything from how power is divided
within the military leadership or how many soldiers come from each group. I am specifically
interested in demobilization. Demobilization before the first election is the most crucial for
the transition to democracy (not necessarily for democracy’s consolidation) because it takes
away the ability of the election’s losers to start the war again.
I began with the data from Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and with the use of Keesing’s
World Archives, I went through each of their listed negotiated settlements (they list thirty-
eight) and coded a one if the country significantly demobilized before the first election and
zero if they did not. I then went through non-negotiated settlement states in my dataset
to examine whether or not demobilization and/or elections were a part of the post conflict
state even after an outright victory. If elections were scheduled and demobilization accom-
panied them, I also coded a one if demobilization was complete before the first election. All
other states received a zero. The searches were conducted by entering the term “country
and demobilization”, then if that yielded no results I entered the term “country and disar-
mament”. If that also yielded no results I simply entered the country name for the war and
post civil war peace period of about two years. In addition to Keesing’s, I also consulted
some other works that contained case studies of peacekeeping operations. These were the
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United Nations’ (1996) Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping and the
Rand Corporation’s (2005) The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq. If
there were no results in Keesing’s or the other sources for either elections or demobilization,
then states were coded as a zero.
This university’s subscription to Keesing’s only covers the period of 1960 to the present.
My dataset goes back to 1947, however. In order to get codings for those states not covered
by Keesing’s, I consulted multiple sources. First, I began with the method of consulting
my committee chair, David Mason, a civil wars expert. He went through the list noting
which states had elections after their civil war. Most of the states in this list did not have
elections, and thus were not candidates for receiving a one for demobilization before the
first election. For the states that Dr. Mason was not able to give any information on,
I consulted The Encyclopedia of World History, edited by Stearns (2001). This provided
enough information to code nearly all of the cases missing from the first round. There were
two problematic cases remaining from this round of coding, Bolivia’s (1952-1952) revolution
and the Huk rebellion (ended in 1952) in the Philippines. For these two cases, I consulted
two secondary sources. For Bolivia, I looked through Klein’s (2003) A Concise History
of Bolivia and for the Philippines, I consulted Kerkvliet’s (2002 [1977]) The Huk Rebellion.
From the examination of the remaining cases, only one is coded as a one. Bolivia’s revolution
destroyed the former military, garnering a complete replacement by the rebel army. Elections
followed four years after the revolution. However, given my coding rules, this should be
coded as a one. In future work on demobilization, should this variable be of interest for the
study, perhaps a more nuanced coding scheme will be necessary to take into account the
differences between formal, organized, and negotiated demobilization processes and forced
demobilization through violence. However, for this research, the more crude variable is
sufficient.
This is a very rudimentary coding process. However, due to the lack of any systematic
database on the timing of demobilization, this is the best for the this project at the moment.
A more ideal approach would take more time, but would be to create a database noting the
day that the civil war ends, and to gauge the extent of demobilization by number of arms
demobilized versus how many were intended to be demobilized before the first election. An
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ideal database would contain dates for all three major events: end of the conflict, completion
of demobilization, and the first election. Table A below lists the countries that had successful
demobilizations before their first elections after the civil war.
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APPENDIX TO THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the alternate models for peacekeeping, the results of the propor-
tional hazards test on the two sets of results presented in the main body, and the results
of the Weibull tests on the main models. I begin with the alternate peacekeeping models,
displayed in Table B.1. The table presents the hazard ratios along with the two-tailed p-
values. Though not presented in these tables, the tests were conducted with robust standard
errors clustered on peace periods. I discussed the major findings of Table B1. in Chapter
4, but I want to note that the effect of multicollinearity between sustained peacemaking
operations and the peacekeeping control may be affecting the significance of the sustained
operations. As the table shows, sustained peacemaking is significant when the peacekeeping
control variable is dropped from the analysis. However, the peacekeeping control retains its
significance from the models shown in Chapter 4 when sustained peacemaking operations
are dropped. The major message from all of this that that peacekeeping operations do sig-
nificantly contribute to states become democracies after civil wars, but that the effect of
specific mission characteristics may be masked because of the crudeness of the data. Since
these are cross-sectional dummy variables and are not affected by changes over time, they
simply may not properly illustrate statistically the differences between missions.
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TABLE B.1. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity ≥ 5 (2-tailed p-value in brackets)
Variable No PK Control No Sustained PK
Negotiated Settlement 5.045 [0.002] 4.478 [0.008]
Rebel Victory 1.141 [0.798] 1.225 [0.682]
Sustained Peacemaking 3.199 [0.003]
Multi-Dimensional Peace-
building
0.676 [0.433] 0.586 [0.306]
Demobilization Before First
Election
2.749 [0.001] 1.712 [0.139]
Cold War 1.102 [0.797] 1.259 [0.570]
Hostile International Envi-
ronment
0.946 [0.921] 0.668 [0.350]
Economic Development 1.486 [0.007] 1.595 [0.007]
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.499 [0.278] 0.500 [0.347]
Identity Wars 0.932 [0.836] 0.781 [0.515]
Any Peacekeeping 3.465 [0.003]
Military Powersharing 0.447 [0.142] 0.543 [0.228]
Military Intervention 0.255 [0.005] 0.254 [0.010]
Subjects: 95; Failures: 35 N= 751 Wald χ2: 75.73; p> χ2: 0.0000 Wald χ2: 93.95; p> χ2: 0.0000
Tables B.1 and B.2 display the proportional hazards tests for the two Cox hazard models
run in the analysis as well as the alternate results for the Weibull hazard models. These
tests are conducted to determine if the hypotheses tests are reliable and to see if there are
any major time effects that could be making the model provide inaccurate results.
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TABLE B.2. Proportional Hazards Test for Polity ≥ 5
Variable ρ χ2 df p > χ2
Negotiated Settlement 0.03341 0.09 1 0.7698
Rebel Victory 0.07435 0.16 1 0.6924
Sustained Peacemaking -0.07987 0.25 1 0.6152
Multi-Dimensional Peace-
building
0.04994 0.14 1 0.7057
Demobilization Before First
Election
0.19773 1.13 1 0.2873
Cold War -0.00511 0.00 1 0.9740
Hostile International Envi-
ronment
-0.17208 1.05 1 0.3056
Economic Development -0.04867 0.11 1 0.7354
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.07339 0.27 1 0.6011
Identity Wars -0.04711 0.08 1 0.7788
Any Peacekeeping -0.08978 0.49 1 0.4847
Military Powersharing 0.00478 0.00 1 0.9677
Military Intervention 0.26080 2.98 1 0.0842
Global Test 5.41 13 0.9650
The results of the proportional hazards tests show that there is only one violation of
the proportional hazards assumption in either Cox model. This is likely a result of the fact
that most of the variables are actually coded as cross-sectional characteristics of the conflict
and the post conflict state, rather than being the time sensitive characteristics that they
often are in reality. Only military interventions shows some violation of the proportional
hazards assumption. This means that this variable may be to some degree time dependant.
However, I have confidence in the results presented in Chapter 4 on this variable as military
interventions is also significant across both time dependant Weibull models presented below.
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TABLE B.3. Proportional Hazards Test for Polity ≥ 7
Variable ρ χ2 df p > χ2
Negotiated Settlement -0.11041 0.42 1 0.5170
Rebel Victory -0.10060 0.35 1 0.5536
Sustained Peacemaking -0.05892 0.12 1 0.7314
Multi-Dimensional Peace-
building
0.05562 0.04 1 0.8363
Demobilization Before First
Election
0.25577 0.99 1 0.3204
Cold War -0.04137 0.04 1 0.8360
Hostile International Envi-
ronment
-0.07809 0.16 1 0.6936
Economic Development -0.07877 0.30 1 0.5813
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.07593 0.14 1 0.7088
Identity Wars 0.11680 0.41 1 0.5228
Any Peacekeeping -0.06973 0.33 1 0.5682
Military Powersharing 0.00066 0.00 1 0.9975
Military Intervention 0.36812 2.15 1 0.1426
Global Test 3.63 13 0.9945
Though I believe there is not much reason to assume monotonic duration dependence
for my analysis, I run tests with the same model as in Chapter 5 using a Weibull test. A
Weibull hazard model makes the assumption that as time goes on, a subject is either more
or likely to experience a “failure” of some sort (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In the
case of my analysis, the Weibull model assumes that the further removed in time from the
end of the civil war, a country will either be more or less likely to experience a democratic
transition. Tables B.4 and B.5 are the results for the Weibull models.
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TABLE B.4. Weibull Model for Polity ≥ 5
Variable Hazard Ratio [S.E.] P-Value (2-tailed)
Negotiated Settlement 13.080 [11.074]*** 0.002
Rebel Victory 1.521 [1.004] 0.525











Economic Development 1.406 [0.317]* 0.131
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.368 [0.378] 0.331
Identity Wars 0.753 [0.376] 0.570
Any Peacekeeping 4.422 [3.745]** 0.079
Military Powersharing 0.351 [0.262]* 0.161
Military Intervention 0.088 [0.085]*** 0.012
Subjects: 95; Failures: 35;
N=751
1-tailed sig.: *=0.10, **=0.05,
***=0.01
Wald χ2: 106.78; p > χ2: 0.0000
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TABLE B.5. Weibull Model for Polity ≥ 7
Variable Hazard Ratio [S.E.] P-Value (2-tailed)
Negotiated Settlement 10.218 [7.639]*** 0.002
Rebel Victory 1.677 [1.319] 0.511











Economic Development 1.599 [0.468]** 0.109
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.337 [0.396] 0.355
Identity Wars 0.676 [0.387] 0.492
Any Peacekeeping 5.269 [5.377]** 0.103
Military Powersharing 0.303 [0.203]** 0.075
Military Intervention 0.062 [0.061]*** 0.005
Subjects: 95; Failures: 26;
N=821
1-tailed sig.: *=0.10, **=0.05,
***=0.01
Wald χ2: 37.34; p > χ2: 0.0004
The results of the Weibull tests are not that much different from the results in the Cox
models. The χ2 statistics for both models are significant. The only two differences across
the two models compared to the Cox models presented in Chapter 4, in terms of statistical
significance, is that demobilization and military powersharing do not display significance
in the first model. This may indicate that the effect of demobilization or a powersharing
agreement dwindle over time. Another difference is that the impact of negotiated settlements
is shown to be much stronger in these tests. I do not spend much time or space trying to
infer anything from the Weibull results, as I do not believe that the decision to become a
democracy is time dependant. It seems just as likely that any institutional choice, such as a
power-sharing oligarchy or a dictatorship, would emerge years after a civil war. However, the
results of these tests do provide robust evidence that negotiated settlements, peacekeeping,
56




Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Andrew Enterline. 2000. “Killing Time: The World Politics of
Civil War Duration.” International Studies Quarterly 44: 615-42.
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 2005. “Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy,
and U.S. Arms Exports.” International Studies Quarterly 49:647-67.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Bradford S. Jones. 1997. “Time is of the Essence: Event
History Models in Political Science.” American Journal of Political Science 41:1414-61.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Downs. 2006. “Intervention and Democracy.”
International Organization 60: 627-49.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow.
2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie Cherif.
2005. “Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights.”
International Studies Quarterly 49:439-57.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford Economic
Papers. 56:563-95.
Correlates of War Project. 2000. “Cow Intra-State War, version 3.0” dataset. Online at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org.
Correlates of War Project. 2004. “Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, version 3.0”
dataset. Online at http://www.correlatesofwar.org.
Cunningham, David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of
Political Science 50: 875-92.
58
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Diehl, Paul F. 1993. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard
Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. 2005. The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the
Congo to Iraq. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation.
Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical
and Quantitative Analysis.” American Political Science Review 94: 779-801.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49:
379-414.
Fearon, James D. 2002. “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World.” Pre-
sented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review 97: 75-90.
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace
after Civil and Interstate Wars.” International Studies Review 5: 97114.
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention
and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.” International Studies Quarterly 48: 26992.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.”
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming.
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. “The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001:
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:
133-54.
Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Michael D. Ward. 1997. “Double Take: A Reexamination of
Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 361-
83.
59
Greig, J. Michael and Thorin M. Wright. 2006. “Stay the Course? A Competing Risks
Analysis of the Sustainability and Termination of Peacekeeping Operations.” Presented at
the Peace Science Society (International) Conference. November 10-12, 2006, Columbus,
Ohio.
Greig, J. Michael and Paul F. Diehl. 2005. “The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma.”
International Studies Quarterly 49: 62145.
Gurses, Mehmet and T. David Mason. 2006. ‘Democracy Out of Anarchy: How Do Features
of A Civil War Influence the Likelihood of Post-Civil War Democracy?” Working paper;
earlier version presented at the 2006 International Studies Association Conference, San
Diego.
Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. “Stabilizing the Peace
After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables.” International Organization
55: 183-208.
Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and
Post-Civil War Conflict Management.” American Journal of Political Science 47: 318-32.
Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. “Toward
a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.”
American Political Science Review 95: 33-48.
Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell. 2003. “Civil War Settlement and the Implementa-
tion of Military Power-Sharing Agreements.” Journal of Peace Research 40: 303-20.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. “Militarized Interstate
Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Man-
agement and Peace Science 15: 163-213.
Keesing’s Record of World Events. Various Years. Keesing’s Worldwide.
Keller, Bill. 1988. “Soviet Military Wary of Arms Cuts.” The New York Times. A-3,
December 22.
60
Kerkvliet, Benedict J. 1977 [2002]. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the
Philippines. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Klein, Herbert S. 2003. A Concise History of Bolivia. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Licklider, Roy. 1995. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-
1993.” American Political Science Review 89: 681-90.
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53: 69-105.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-
tion: Southern Europe, South American, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Manning, Carrie. 2001. “Competition and Accommodation in Post-Conflict Democracy:
The Case of Mozambique.” Democratization 8: 140-68.
Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers. 2005.Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual Part of
the Polity IV project, availiable at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity
Mason, T. David and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. “How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice
Approach.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40: 546-68.
Mason, T. David, Joseph P. Weingarten, Jr. and Patrick J. Fett. 1999. “Win, Lose or Draw:
Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 52: 239-68.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Mukherjee, Bumba. 2006. “Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring
Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?” International Studies Quarterly
50: 479-504.
Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. “Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influ-
ences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.” International Studies
Quarterly 49: 529-55.
61
Mullenbach, Mark and William Dixon. 2006. “Third Party Peacekeeping Missions: 1945-
2005.” Dataset
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paris, Roland. 1997. “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.” Interna-
tional Security 22: 54-89.
Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity
in the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review 88: 843-852.
Poe, Steven C., T. David Mason, Cynthia Colley and Jason Quinn. 2005. “Human Rights,
Democracy, and Sustaining the Peace After Civil War.” Working Paper.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000.
Democracy and Development: Political Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist
Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Com-
parative Politics 2: 337-363.
Salehyan, Idean. 2008. “No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict.”
Journal of Politics. Forthcoming.
Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Gleditsch. 2006. “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War.”
International Organization 60: 335-66.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid. 2000. “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997.”
Conflict Management and Peace Science 18: 123-144.
62
Stearns, Peter N., ed. 2001. The Encyclopedia of World History, 6 ed. New York: Houghton
Mifflin Co.
Toft, Monica Duffy. 2003. The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and
Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International
Organization 51: 335-64.
Walter, Barbara F. 1999. “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democ-
ratization, and Commitments to Peace.” International Security 24: 127-55.
Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. “The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Inves-
tigation.” American Political Science Review 98: 17-33.
Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49: 598-624.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2001. “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization,
Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador.” Comparative
Political Studies 34: 862-88.
63
